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TYING ARRANGEMENTS: REQUISITE ECONOMIC POWER,
PROMOTIONAL TIES AND THE SINGLE PRODUCT DEFENSE
In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.' the
Supreme Court held that a tie of prefabricated homes to advantageous
credit terms constituted an illegal tying arrangement 2
 under Section 1
of the Sherman Acts The decision may be interpreted as establishing
a strict per se rule of illegality because the Court has arguably elimi-
nated the traditional requirement of proving the seller's "economic
power" in the tying product market. The decision also questions the
legality of "promotional tying arrangements," tying arrangements in
which the tying product is offered at a very low or nominal price.
Finally, Fortner raises the question of the requirements of a successful
"single product defense," a defense to the allegation of tying based
upon the position that, since only one product is involved, no tying
arrangement exists.
I. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.
Plaintiff Fortner sought treble damages and an injunction against
United States Steel Corporation for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.' The complaint alleged that United States Steel and
its wholly owned subsidiary, United States Steel Homes .Credit Cor-
poration, violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the latter
granted Fortner a loan for the purchase and development of land in
the Louisville, Kentucky area only on the condition that Fortner pur-
chase prefabricated homes manufactured by United States Steel for
each of the lots in the subdivision. The Credit Corporation had agreed
to loan Fortner $2,000,000, of which $1,700,000 was to be used for
the purchase and installation of the homes from United States Steel,
and the balance for land acquisition and development. 5
 Fortner further
alleged that the homes supplied by United States Steel were not only
of substandard quality, but cost $400 more per home than similar
models of United States Steel's competitors. Fortner maintained that
it agreed to the tying arrangement only because the Credit Corporation
1 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
2
 A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product, the tying
product, but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a second, different
product, the tied product. For a general discussion of tying arrangements see Austin,
The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 88
(1967) ; Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626
(1965) ; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1958).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). This section states: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. • ."
4
 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). Section 2 states: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . ."
5 394 U.S. at 522.
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offered it 100 percent financing at a low interest rate, and that these
terms were unique because no other credit grantor in the Louisville
area would provide such favorable credit terms.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
because it found that the requirements for an illegal tie-in were not
satisfied: the Credit Corporation did not exercise the requisite eco-
nomic power in the credit market, and the restraint on competition in
the market for homes was not substantial.° The court of appeals af-
firmed, adopting the opinion of the lower court.? The Supreme Court,
with Justice Black writing for the majority, reversed and remanded
the case for trial.' The Court held that the pleadings and affidavits of
Fortner sufficiently indicated the possibility of the defendants' eco-
nomic power in the credit market to entitle the plaintiff to go to trial
on this issue, that the volume of commerce allegedly foreclosed by the
tie was substantial, and that the tie of homes to credit did not consti-
tute a single product. The dissenters maintained that there was no
proof offered of United States Steel's economic power in the credit
market, that advantageous credit terms were a form of price competi-
tion in the homes market, and that the alleged tie of homes to credit
constituted a single product.
II. ECONOMIC POWER AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS
The Court has traditionally opposed tying arrangements because
of their "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue."' The anticompetitive effects of tying agreements are twofold:
They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying require-
ments has a better product or a lower price but because of
his power or leverage in another market. At the same time
buyers are forced to forego their free choice between com-
peting products.'
The seller's economic power in the tying product has been considered
a prerequisite to the generation of these anticompetitive effects because
economic power in the tying product market is essential to force buyers
6 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp, 762, 767-69
(W.D. Ky. 1966).
7. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968).
8 The Court reversed on two grounds. The Court first declared that, contrary to
the district court's position the plaintiff did not have to meet the two standards an-
nounced in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), to prevail on
the merits. The Court pointed out that "these standards are necessary only to bring
into play the doctrine of per se illegality," and that the plaintiff could prevail by
proving that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been violated. 394 U.S. at
499-500. Second, the Court stated that the district court "misunderstood" the two con-
trolling standards of Northern Pacific, and that the plaintiff "raised questions of fact
which, if proved at trial, would bring this tying arrangement within the scope of the
per se doctrine." 394 U.S. at 500-01.
9 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
10 Id. at 6.
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to purchase the tied product, thus precluding other sellers of the tied
product from competing.
Although its specific aspects have not been clearly defined, the
requirement that the seller exercise some degree of economic power
in the tying product market has been persistent in the Supreme Court
decisions involving tying arrangements. Early cases largely involved
the tie of unpatented products to patented products, and the Court
generally invalidated the tie because the seller utilized his monopoly
power in the patented tying product market to gain control of the tied
product market." The Court also utilized the theory that a patent
holder, by imposing a tie-in, unreasonably forecloses competitors from
a substantial portion of the tied product market.'
In the first major non-patent tying case, Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States," the Court set forth standards for de-
termining the legality of tying arrangements under both Section 1 of
the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act." Although Section
3 of the Clayton Act specifically proscribes tying arrangements the
effect of which "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,"" this section applies
only to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities" 18 and hence tying agreements which involve services
or land must be brought under the more general provisions of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. In Times-Picayune, the sale of advertising space
in New Orlean's only morning newspaper was conditioned upon the
purchaser's also buying space in the seller's afternoon newspaper which
was in competition with another afternoon daily. Because the sale of
advertising space is presumably a service and not a "commodity," the
case was decided under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
adopted the following standards for determining the legality of tying
arrangements :
11 See Austin, supra note 2, at 104-06. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
12 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The decision
did not discuss the dominance or economic power of International Salt in the salt-
dispensing machines market, the tying product market, but only International Salt's
foreclosure of competitors from a substantial portion of the salt market, the tied product
market. It has been argued that the Court may have been implying that dominance is
presumed when the tying product is patented or "distinctive," or that proof of dom-
inance is unnecessary to invalidate a tie-in, or even that dominance is presumed from
the existence of a tie-in. See also Turner, supra note 2, at 52-54.
1 .1 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
14 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . make
a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities .. on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
. . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
. . . seller, where the effect of such . . . sale, or contract for sale or such con-
dition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
10 Id.
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From the "tying" cases a perceptible pattern of illegality
emerges: When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in
the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce
in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement
violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act because from either factor the requisite potential
lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a
lawful monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market," a tying arrange-
ment is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever both
conditions are met."
The Court analyzed the defendant's quantitative position in the news-
paper advertising market in New Orleans, and concluded that the
defendant was not "dominant" in the market for the tying product
because the sale of advertising space in the morning newspaper ac-
counted for only 40 percent of the total advertising sold in all three
dailies. The Court, therefore, considered Times-Picayune's afternoon
edition as a competitor to its morning edition in determining this per-
centage, although it has been observed that, if the relevant market was
newspaper advertising in New Orleans, the defendant's quantitative
position in the market should have been the combined share of each
of its newspapers."
The different tests established by the Court in Times-Picayune
for the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act were apparently fused into
a single standard—"sufficient economic power"—in Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States.")
 There the defendant leased or sold its
"strategically located" land only on condition that the lessees or
vendees ship the commodities produced on the land on its lines.
though the Court held that this tie-in violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Court did not determine whether Northern Pacific had "suf-
ficient economic power" by analyzing the defendant's quantitative
position in the relevant land market. Rather, the Court pointed out
that the land was "strategically located," and that the testimony of
witnesses and "common sense" made it evident that the land was
"prized" by those who purchased or leased it. The Court stated that
tying arrangements
are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product
to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the
tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate
commerce is affected."
17 345 U.S. at 608-09.
18 See Turner, supra note 2, at 55 n.21. In the same note, Professor Turner points
out that if morning and afternoon advertising were separate markets, the defendant
clearly had a 100% monopoly of the morning market.
10 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20 356 U.S. at 6.
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The Court then indicated that if the tying product is desirable and
unique, the requirement of sufficient economic power is satisfied."
In his dissenting opinion in Fortner, Justice Fortas argued that
Northern Pacific, in effect, applied the same standards to
tying arrangements under the Sherman as under the Clayton
Act, on the theory that the anticompetitive effect of a tie-in
was such as to make the difference in language in the statutes
immaterial. 22
Although it may be questionable whether Northern Pacific ac-
tually adopts a single standard for both Acts, a tie involving a service
is not inherently different from one involving a commodity, and thus
the same tests should be applied under both statutes. 2  Moreover, the
sufficient economic power standard is clearly more inclusive than
the "dominance" or "monopolistic position"- standard of Times-
Picayune, and reduces the requirements for proving an antitrust vi-
olation.
The theory that competition in the market for the tied product
can be appreciably restrained by a degree of economic power signif-
icantly less than "dominance" was confirmed in United States v.
Loew's, Inc. 24
 There the Court unanimously held that the tying of in-
ferior films to high quality films violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court pointed out that
[ml arket dominance—some power to control price and to ex-
clude competition—is by no means the only test of whether
the seller has the requisite economic power. Even absent a
showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power
may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to con-
sumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."
The Court readily struck down the block booking of copyrighted films
because "sufficiency of economic power is presumed" when the tying
product is patented or copyrighted.' In its treatment of the economic
power requirement, then, the Court shifted from the requirement of
a showing of "monopolistic position" or "dominance" in the market
to a showing of "desirability" or "uniqueness" of the tying product.
The Court in Fortner purportedly adopted the sufficient eco-
nomic power standard of Northern Pacific. For example, the Court
21 Austin, supra note 2, at 108-09.
22 394 U.S. at 521. It should be noted, however, that the Court has never made a
similar statement. However, it has not indicated since Times-Picayune that a different
test must be applied to determine the legality of tying agreements under the Clayton
Act than is applied under the Sherman Act.
23 For a discussion as to why the difference in language in the two statutes should
be immaterial, see Turner, supra note 2, at 58.
24 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
25 Id. at 45.
26 Id.
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noted that since Fortner was allegedly paying some $400 more per
house than United States Steel's competitors charged for comparable
models, "this substantial price differential with respect to the tied
product (prefabricated homes) in itself may suggest that respondents
had some special economic power in the credit market.''' The Court
therefore suggests that economic power in the tying product can be
indicated when the vendee is required to pay more for the tied product
than he would have to pay for comparable products of other sellers.
This theory is similar to the reasoning in Northern Pacific where the
Court noted that "[t] he very existence of this host of tying arrange-
ments is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at
least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the
existence of these restraints."' Both of these theories are based on
the premise that a tying agreement is an essentially undesirable busi-
ness arrangement which vendees will avoid unless they are thereby
benefited. Where the vendor has sufficient economic power in the
tying product, however, the vendee can be forced to accept the tying
arrangement.
The Court in Fortner also found that the credit terms offered by
United States Steel Homes Credit Corporation reflected the corpo-
ration's economic power in the credit market. Fortner presented an
affidavit by the president of a Louisville finance company which stated
that the Credit Corporation's offer to provide 100 percent financing
at a low interest rate was unique in the Louisville area. Fortner
maintained that it agreed to the tying arrangement only because
the credit terms were so attractive. The Court pointed out that
"uniquely and unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's
unique economic advantages over his competitors."" The Court spec-
ulated that these economic advantages may have been achieved
through economies of scale resulting from the nationwide character
of United States Steel's operations, or because the legal restrictions
faced by banks and loan associations were inapplicable to the Credit
Corporation. The Court reversed the summary judgment for the de-
fendants because the pleadings and affidavits sufficiently disclosed the
possibility of economic power in the credit market to entitle Fortner
to go to trial on this issue.
Although Fortner ostensibly applies the sufficient economic
power standard by examining the evidence of economic power, some
of the Court's reasoning may have defined away the necessity of
proving sufficient economic power to invalidate a tie-in. The Court
first points out that
the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition pro-
vides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie. Such appre-
27 394 U.S. at 504.
28 356 U.S. at 7-8.
29 394 U.S. at 505.
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ciable restraints result whenever the seller can exert some
power over some of the buyers in the market . . .. 3°
If any "appreciable" restraint on competition invalidates a tie, and
if such restraints are the result of the seller's exercising "some power,"
then the crucial question clearly becomes what "some power" means.
The Court points out that if a seller with "economic power" raises his
price,
some group within the market . . . can be forced to accept
the higher prices because of their stronger preferences for the
product, and the seller could therefore choose instead {of
raising prices] to force them to accept a tying arrange-
ment [Emphasis added.]
The Court thus maintains that "market power" can be exercised in
two ways—through the imposition of higher prices or through the
imposition of a tie-in. But if economic power is defined as the ability
to impose a tie-in, then sufficient economic power to appreciably re-
strain free competition in the market for the tied product means no
more than that the seller has the ability to impose a tie-in. It is thus
clear that the "sufficient economic power" standard is automatically
satisfied whenever a tie-in exists.
All that remains of the standards for per se illegality is the re-
quirement that a "not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce
is affected." The Court in Fortner appears to establish this standard
as the single test for determining the legality of tying agreements:
[T]he proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the
power to raise price, or impose other burdensome terms such
as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers
within the market."
Fortner, therefore, may be interpreted as rendering tie-ins per se
illegal whenever they are imposd upon an "apprciable number of
buyers." Presumably, this standard is equivalent to the traditional
standard that the tie must affect a "not insubstantial" amount of inter-
state commerce. The Court in Fortner had little trouble finding that
this standard was satisfied by the plaintiff's allegation that United
States Steel's sales policy of utilizing tying arrangements foreclosed
competitors from prefabricated homes sales of over $2,000,000 per
year from 1960 to 1962.
This "appreciable number of buyers" or "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce criterion is precisely one of the tests
set forth in Times-Picayune for ascertaining the legality of tie-ins
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. In that case the Court considered
it sufficient to invalidate a tying agreement under Section 3 of the
Clayton Act to show that the agreement affected a substantial amount
80 Id. at 503.
81 Id. at 503-04.
82 Id. at 504.
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of interstate commerce in the tied product. Fortner has arguably ap-
plied this reasoning to tying agreements brought under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
Implicit in the Court's elimination of the economic power require-
ment is the assumption that the anticompetitive effects associated with
tying agreements—coercion of the buyer and foreclosure of the seller's
competitors in the tied product market—are generated by every tie-in
imposed upon an "appreciable" number of buyers. This assumption
represents a significant departure from the philosophy of the prior
tying cases which was based upon the premise that only some tying
agreements generate anticompetitive effects, specifically, those in
which the seller has economic power in the tying product market and
a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected. In
Northern Pacific, for example, the Court pointed out that
[o] f course where the seller has no control or dominance over
the tying product so that it does not represent an effectual
weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied item any re-
straint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements
would obviously be insignificant at most."
In his dissent in Fortner Justice White argued that the majority
did not adequately treat the requirement of economic power. He con-
cluded that there was no proof that United States Steel had economic
power in the credit market and that the anticompetitive effects of tying
agreements "depend upon the existence of some market power in the
tying product . . . .""
The Court's assumption that the anticompetitive effects associated
with tying agreements are generated by all tying agreements is ques-
tionable. It is not difficult to hypothesize a tying agreement which is
accepted by an "appreciable" number of buyers simply because it is
the most economical way to purchase both products. In this situation
the buyers are clearly not coerced, and accordingly the competitors
of the seller in the tied product market are not foreclosed. In a situa-
tion where the defendant possesses no economic power to force the
buyers to accept the tie, the Court's assumption that alI tying arrange-
ments generate anticompetitive effects is unwarranted.
Justice White also maintains that "extending the per se rule to
absolute dimensions" by eliminating the economic power requirement
may be undesirable because "tie-ins are not entirely unmitigated
evils . . "35 He points out that, absent economic power, certain tie-ins
may be justified because they are "beneficial" to the economy. In an
oligopolistic market, for example, a tie-in may permit price cutting
where ordinarily there would be no price competition at all because
of each seller's fear that the other sellers would retaliate, thereby de-
33 356 U.S. at 6-7.
34 394 U.S. at 514. For a similar argument, see Pearson, supra note 2, at 644-46.
85 394 U.S. at 514 n.9.
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creasing everyone's profit. 36 If it is no longer necessary to prove
economic power in the tying product to invalidate a tie-in, it is clear
that such "beneficial" tie-ins will be held illegal if a not insubstantial
amount of interstate commerce is affected. Such a result would be
incompatible with the promotion of economic efficiency.
The Court in Fortner, therefore, modifies the economic power
requirement in three ways. First, the Court takes the novel step of
defining economic power as the ability to impose a tie-in. Second, the
Court suggests that economic power can be inferred from the existence
of a tie-in when the seller is able to impose a large number of tie-ins
or when the tied product is clearly not priced competitively. Although
related to the first, this test is clearly less inclusive. Finally, the Court
indicates that a seller's economies of scale and advantageous legal
position may be indicia of economic power.
III. PROMOTIONAL TYING ARRANGEMENTS
In support of their argument that the Credit Corporation's eco-
nomic power in the credit market had not been shown, United States
Steel and the dissenters contended that offering low-cost credit terms
is not an indication of economic power, but is simply a form of price
competition that actually constitutes a price reduction in the tied
product, prefabricated homes. However, the majority stated that tie-
ins serve "no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in
some less restrictive way . . ."" The majority argued that the seller
can achieve his alleged purpose of competing in the tied product
market "without extending his economic power, by simply reducing
the price of the tied product itself."3s Thus, a tie of homes to low
priced credit generates anticompetitive effects in the tied product while
a simple price reduction in the tied product does not generate these
undesirable effects.
Justice White, on the other hand, argued that, absent economic
power in the tying product, there are no anticompetitive effects gen-
erated by a "promotional" tying agreement where the seller offers the
tying product at an unusually low price or gives it away. Buyers are
not coerced because they may purchase both products elsewhere at
normal terms, and the seller's competitors are not foreclosed from
these sales because they can compete by reducing the price of the tied
product 3 6 The promotional tie-in, in this view, is only another form of
price competition. As Justice White pointed out "It] here is no good
reason why U.S. Steel should always be required to make the price
cut in one form rather than another .... 140
In rebuttal to the majority's contention that tying agreements
serve no legitimate business purpose because the sale could be made in
36 Id. In this footnote, Justice White lists other situations in which tie-ins may be
beneficial to the economy.
27 394 U.S. at 503.
28 Id. at SOS.
28 Id. at 515.
4° Td.
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a less restrictive way, it can be argued that United States Steel is com-
peting for a submarket of the prefabricated homes market, the Fort-
ner-type market. This market is comprised of the entrepreneur-
developer with the idea and ability, but without capital and with little
probability of obtaining enough capital at a cost he can afford. To
such entrepreneurs, price competition in the form of advantageous
credit terms is more attractive than simple price reductions in the
cost of the homes. To capture this market, therefore, United States
Steel takes a high competitive risk and offers very advantageous credit
terms. To compensate for taking such a high risk to reach this sub-
market, United States Steel raises its price for the tied product: but
the buyers willingly accept the tying arrangement because it enables
them to do business. Since such a tying arrangement promotes rather
than restrains competition, it should not be proscribed under the
antitrust laws.
If in the future the courts interpret Fortner as requiring only a
showing that the tie affects an "appreciable" number of buyers,
it is clear that most if not all promotional tying arrangements will
be held illegal. This result may be undesirable to the extent that
promotional ties constitute a form of price competition and that such
ties may enable the seller to effectively reach a submarket of the tied
product market.
IV. THE SINGLE PRODUCT DEFENSE
Regarding advantageous credit terms as a form of price competi-
tion in the tied product illustrates the close relationship between a
product and the credit provided by the seller to purchase it. This close
relationship logically suggests the single product defense: if one es-
tablishes that the alleged "tying" and "tied" products are not two
distinct products but, rather, a single product, then by definition there
can be no tying arrangement. Prior to Fortner the Supreme Court had
discussed the single product defense only once, in Times-Picayune.
There the Court decided that only one product was involved, the sale
of readership to advertisers." But the Court simply asserted there
was a single product; it failed to set forth any standard by which this
determination should be made."
In Fortner both dissents expressed the fear that the majority
holding may render illegal the offering of goods for sale on attractive
credit terms. The Court recognized this problem and maintained that
in the "usual sale on credit . . . the credit may constitute such an in-
separable part of the purchase price for the item that the entire trans-
action could be considered to involve only a single product."" The
Court then attempted to distinguish the United States Steel arrangement
as being a "far cry" from the usual sale on credit on two grounds. The
Court first pointed out that in Fortner "the credit [was] provided by
41 345 U.S. at 613-14.
42 Pearson, supra note 2, at 628.
43 394 U.S. at 507.
315
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
one corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a
separate corporation."' 4 The validity of this distinction is questionable
in light of the fact that the Credit Corporation is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of United States Steel. Furthermore, the Credit Corporation,
according to the district court, is merely the financing arm of United
States Steel's Homes Division. 46
The Court further distinguished this arrangement from the usual
sale on credit because the "borrower contracts to obtain a large sum
of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical
products purchased."46 Although the Court did not cite the case, this
distinction is similar to one of the tests employed by the district court
in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp. 47 which involved the
alleged tie of a complete master antenna system to a highly innovative
booster device—one of many parts in the system. The defendant
pleaded that the booster was a part of the master antenna system, a
single product. One of the tests employed by the district court to de-
termine if there were two separate products was to examine the uni-
formity of the alleged single product, the antenna system. The district
court found that "hardly any two versions of the alleged product were
the same."48 Similarly, the Court in Fortner seems to imply that if
the loan had covered only the cost of the homes, it might have been
persuaded that there was a single product. Resolving the single product
issue in Fortner by applying the uniformity test employed in Jerrold
is inappropriate because the test seems best suited to physical products,
the functionally interdependent parts of a machine for, example, which
uare always manufactured in the same numbers. It is unrealistic, how-
ever, to expect that the credit provided by a seller will always be a
fixed percentage of the price of the goods. Different purchasers will
receive more or Iess credit because of a variety of factors such as the
risk involved. Furthermore, although the application of the uniformity
test to Fortner seems to indicate that there is not a single product, the
test should be applied no more dogmatically than it was in Jerrold.
There the district court recognized that the non-uniformity of the
alleged single product was in part attributable to the particular job
the system was designed to accomplish. 49
Similarly, Justice Fortas, in his dissent in Fortner, dismissed the
financing of the land purchase and development as "ancillary costs
connected with the sale . .. ."" He vigorously contended that the
transaction involved only a single product:
Provision of special financing to the prospective purchaser
of prefabricated houses by the Credit Corporation was in-
44 Id.
45 293 F. Supp. at 764.
45 394 U.S. at 507.
47 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
48 Id. at 559.
49 Id.
50 394 U.S. at 523.
316
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
timately and exclusively related to the end object of the sale
of the houses by the Homes Division. It was not a separate
item of "sale!'"
Since Fortner was a dormant corporation in deficit when the loan
agreement was concluded, it could be argued that United States Steel
had to finance these costs if it were to make a sale of its homes. In
light of Justice Fortas' argument that $300,000 of the $2,000,000 loan
was for ancillary costs connected with the sale of the homes, it is
difficult to accept the Court's attempt to distinguish the United States
Steel arrangement from the usual sale on credit on the ground that
the Credit Corporation extended more credit to Fortner than it needed
to purchase the homes from United States Steel. Moreover, the Court
failed to set forth a standard applicable to the single product defense;
it was content to point out two of the factual peculiarities of the case,
and conclude that the arrangement involved more than a single prod-
uct.
In addition to the uniformity test, another test applied by the Jer-
rold Court seems to have some relevance to the problem in Fortner—
the practice of other competitors in the product market. United States
Steel maintained that its Credit Corporation was established solely to
provide financing for customers of the Homes Division desiring credit,
and that this was done "to compete with other prefabricated house
manufacturers . . . and other building material manufacturers who
provide such assistance to their customers."' Although no evidence
was presented on the point, it seems almost certain that these com-
petitors would provide financing to a customer only if he agreed to
purchase that seller's homes.
It has been maintained that this conditional provision of credit
extends beyond the prefabricated homes market and is typical through-
out the economy. In his dissent Justice White stated:
Provision of credit financing by the seller of a commodity to
its buyer is a very common event in the American economy.
. [T] he seller . • . generally . . . restricts his credit to the
purchasers of the commodity which he is principally in the
business of selling.'"
In Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp.," the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated that " ja]rticles, though physically
distinct, may be related through circumstances. The sound business
interests of the seller . . . may be such a circumstance."" It is diffi-
cult to imagine a more sound business interest than assuring the sale
of goods for which the seller has extended substantial credit.
51 Id. at 525.
52 Brief for Respondents at 5, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
53 394 U.S. at 515.
54 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961).
55 Id. at 653.
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In Fortner the Court failed to confront the complexity of the
single product defense. This failure is complicated by the fact that the
defense is clearly related to the contention that provision of advan-
tageous credit terms is a form of price competition in the homes mar-
ket. The financing of the sale of a commodity is inextricably bound to
the sale of that commodity, and accordingly if one decreases the price
of the financing he decreases the price of the commodity. In light of
the importance of credit and other ancillary services provided by
sellers, it seems almost certain that the Court will have to resolve these
issues in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Fortner decision represents a significant departure from
earlier tying cases under Section 1 of the Sherman Act in that the
Court appears to have eliminated the requirement of proving sufficient
economic power in the tying product. The new test set out in Fortner
is whether the tie affects an "appreciable" number of buyers or a "not
insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce in the tied product.
This standard is overly inclusive and would proscribe tying arrange-
ments which do not generate the anti-competitive effects generally
associated with tie-ins. The new standard does, however, achieve con-
sistency between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in view of the
holding in Times-Picayune" that it is sufficient under Section 3 of
the Clayton Act to show that the tie affects a substantial amount of
interstate commerce in the tied product.
Fortner was probably not the proper case for effecting such a
significant change in the law regarding tying agreements. Because the
case came before the Court on summary judgment, several important
issues were not, and probably could not be, adequately treated by the
Court. First, the "appreciable number of buyers" standard could not
be adequately formulated or applied in the absence of fact finding
below. Secondly, the concept of promotional tying arrangements was
not adequately explored to determine if United States Steel was pro-
viding attractive credit terms to engage in a form of price competition
to reach a new market. Finally, since the tying product was credit,
which is closely related to the sale of any product, the Court confused
rather than clarified the viability of the single product defense by
failing to set forth any standard for its application.
RAYMOND J. BRASSARD
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